No person shall operate a motor vehicle, nor shall any owner of such vehicle permit it to be operated upon any way, except fire department and fire patrol apparatus, unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a muffler to prevent excessive or unnecessary noise, which muffler is in good working order and in constant operation, and complies with such minimum standards for construction and performance as the registrar may prescribe.
No person shall use a muffler cut-out or by-pass. No person shall operate a motor vehicle on any way which motor vehicle is equipped 1 with a muffler from which the baffle plates, screens or other original internal parts have been removed and not replaced; or 2 with an exhaust system which has been modified in a manner which will amplify or increase the noise emitted by the exhaust. No person operating a motor vehicle shall sound a bell, horn or other device, nor in any manner operate such motor vehicle so as to make a harsh, objectionable or unreasonable noise, nor permit to escape from such vehicle smoke or pollutants in such amounts or at such levels as may violate motor vehicle air pollution control regulations adopted under the provisions of chapter one hundred and eleven.
No siren shall be mounted upon any motor vehicle except fire apparatus, ambulances, vehicles used in official line of duty by any member of the police or fire fighting forces of the commonwealth or any agency or political subdivision thereof, and vehicles owned by call fire fighters or by persons with police powers and operated in official line of duty, unless authorized by the registrar.
No person shall use on or in connection with any motor vehicle a spot light, so called, the rays from which shine more than two feet above the road at a distance of thirty feet from the vehicle, except that such a spot light may be used for the purpose of reading signs, and as an auxiliary light in cases of necessity when the other lights required by law fail to operate.
The driver of a motor vehicle shall when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation give audible warning with his horn but shall not otherwise use the horn when upon a highway. A vehicle shall not be equipped with nor shall a person use upon a vehicle a siren, whistle, or bell, except as otherwise permitted in this section. A commercial vehicle may be equipped with a theft alarm signal device which is so arranged that it cannot be used by the driver as an ordinary warning signal.
In those cases the driver of the vehicle shall sound the siren when necessary to warn pedestrians and other drivers of the approach of the vehicle. However, the horn or other warning device must not emit an unreasonably loud or harsh sound or a whistle. The driver of a motor vehicle shall, when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation, give audible warning with the horn, but shall not otherwise use the horn when upon a highway.
It is permissible, but not required, for any commercial vehicle to be equipped with a theft alarm signal device, so arranged that it cannot be used by the driver as an ordinary warning signal. All authorized emergency vehicles must be equipped with a siren capable of emitting sound audible under normal conditions from a distance of not less than feet and of a type conforming to the federal certification standards for sirens, as determined by the General Services Administration.
However, the siren must not be used except when the vehicle is operated in response to an emergency call or in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, in which latter events the driver of the vehicle shall sound the siren when necessary to warn pedestrians and other drivers of the vehicle's approach.
The driver of a motor vehicle shall, when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation, give audible warning with his horn but shall not otherwise use such horn upon a highway. No horn or other warning device shall emit an unreasonably loud or harsh sound or a whistle. Any authorized emergency vehicle may be equipped with a siren, whistle, or bell, capable of emitting sound audible under normal conditions from a distance of not less than five hundred feet and of a type approved by the department.
No such siren shall be used except when such vehicle is operated in response to an emergency call or in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, in which said latter events the driver of such vehicle shall sound such siren when necessary to warn pedestrians and other drivers of the approach thereof.
No bicycle shall be equipped with nor shall any person use upon a bicycle any siren or whistle. Missouri Law Other equipment of motor vehicles — violations, penalty. Signaling devices: Every motor vehicle shall be equipped with a horn, directed forward, or whistle in good working order, capable of emitting a sound adequate in quantity and volume to give warning of the approach of such vehicle to other users of the highway and to pedestrians.
Such signaling device shall be used for warning purposes only and shall not be used for making any unnecessary noise, and no other sound-producing signaling device shall be used at any time.
Montana Code - Horns, security alarms, and warning devices. A horn or other warning device may not emit an unreasonably loud or harsh sound or a whistle.
The driver of a motor vehicle shall when reasonably necessary to ensure safe operation give audible warning with the horn but may not otherwise use the horn when upon a highway. The siren may not be used except when the vehicle is operated in response to an emergency call or in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, in which event the driver of the vehicle shall sound the siren when reasonably necessary to warn pedestrians and other drivers of the vehicle's approach.
Except as otherwise provided in this section, it shall be unlawful for any vehicle to be equipped with or for any person to use upon a vehicle any siren, exhaust, compression, or spark plug whistle or for any person at any time to use a horn, otherwise than as a reasonable warning, or to make any unnecessary or unreasonably loud or harsh sound by means of a horn or other warning device.
Every police and fire department and fire patrol vehicle and every ambulance used for emergency calls shall be equipped with a bell, siren, or exhaust whistle. NRS D. Every motor vehicle when operated upon a highway must be equipped with a horn in good working order and capable of emitting sound audible under normal conditions from a distance of not less than feet, but the horn or other warning device must not emit an unreasonably loud or harsh sound or a whistle.
A person driving a motor vehicle shall, when reasonably necessary to ensure safe operation, give audible warning with the horn, but shall not otherwise use the horn when upon a highway.
A vehicle must not be equipped with, and a person shall not use upon a vehicle, a siren, whistle or bell, except as otherwise provided in this chapter. It is permissible, but not required, to equip a vehicle with a theft alarm which is arranged so that it cannot be used by the driver as an ordinary warning signal. The driver of a motor vehicle shall, when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation, give audible warning with his horn but shall not otherwise use such horn when upon a highway.
The driver of a motor vehicle shall when reasonably necessary to ensure safe operation give audible warning with his horn but shall not otherwise use such horn when upon a highway. Article 9 Section a - Every motor vehicle, operated or driven upon the public highways of the state, shall be provided with adequate brakes and steering mechanism in good working order and sufficient to control such vehicle at all times when the same is in use, and a suitable and adequate horn or other device for signaling, which horn or device shall produce a sound sufficiently loud to serve as a danger warning but shall not be used other than as a reasonable warning nor be unnecessarily loud or harsh.
Every motor vehicle when operated upon a highway shall be equipped with a horn in good working order capable of emitting sound audible under normal conditions from a distance of not less than feet, and it shall be unlawful, except as otherwise provided in this section, for any vehicle to be equipped with or for any person to use upon a vehicle any siren, compression or spark plug whistle or for any person at any time to use a horn otherwise than as a reasonable warning or to make any unnecessary or unreasonable loud or harsh sound by means of a horn or other warning device.
All such horns and warning devices shall be maintained in good working order and shall conform to regulation not inconsistent with this section to be promulgated by the Commissioner.
Century Code Horn and warning device - While being operated upon a highway, every motor vehicle must be equipped with a horn in good working order and capable of emitting sound audible under normal conditions from a distance of not less than two hundred feet [ Whenever reasonably necessary for safe operation, the driver of a motor vehicle upon a highway shall give audible warning with the vehicle's horn, but may not otherwise use the vehicle's horn while upon a highway.
No vehicle may be equipped with nor may any person use upon a vehicle any siren, whistle, or bell, except as otherwise permitted in this section. Any vehicle may be equipped with a theft alarm signal device which is so arranged that it cannot be used by the driver as an ordinary warning signal. Any authorized emergency vehicle may be equipped with a siren, whistle, or bell, capable of emitting sound audible under normal conditions from a distance of not less than five hundred feet [ Ohio Code No motor vehicle or trackless trolley shall be equipped with, nor shall any person use upon a vehicle, any siren, whistle, or bell.
Any vehicle may be equipped with a theft alarm signal device which shall be so arranged that it cannot be used as an ordinary warning signal. Every emergency vehicle shall be equipped with a siren, whistle, or bell, capable of emitting sound audible under normal conditions from a distance of not less than five hundred feet and of a type approved by the director of public safety. Such equipment shall not be used except when such vehicle is operated in response to an emergency call or is in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, in which case the driver of the emergency vehicle shall sound such equipment when it is necessary to warn pedestrians and other drivers of the approach thereof.
B Whoever violates this section is guilty of a minor misdemeanor. The driver of a motor vehicle shall, when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation, give audible warning with a horn but shall not otherwise use such horn when upon a highway.
No vehicle shall be equipped with nor shall any person use upon a vehicle any siren, except as otherwise permitted in subsection D of this section. A theft alarm signal device shall not use a siren, as described in subsection D of this section. The result, involving an issue of first impression, was a judgment in favor of the property owner and the dismissal of the lawsuit. In , settled a multi-million real property dispute between a tribal gaming corporation and a Niagara Falls-based real estate developer.
In , following a reversal by the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division, First Department, of the arbitration award vacatur described below, co-led a team that convinced the First Department to reverse itself and affirm the vacatur. In , co-led an arbitration team in a nine-figure dispute with the State of New York on behalf of a sovereign Indian Nation.
The dispute, which involved issues of gaming revenues and contract interpretation, was settled following a four-day arbitration hearing. In , following a three-week jury trial, obtained a no-cause verdict on behalf of a New York-based architectural firm in a seven-figure professional malpractice action.
In , obtained a declaratory judgment in New Hampshire State Court in a non-compete contract dispute between rival national fitness facility companies. In , represented the special committee of a publicly-traded company in a lawsuit brought by minority shareholders seeking to enjoin a multi-million dollar going-private transaction.
After expedited discovery and motion practice, the suit was settled and the deal closed. In , obtained the reversal of a lower court ruling at the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in favor of tribal officials who had asserted sovereign immunity in a complex commercial dispute. In , obtained the vacatur of a commercial arbitration award in New York State Supreme Court, New York County, on grounds that the arbitrator had exceeded his powers and violated the rules of the American Arbitration Association.
In , settled a six-year breach-of-contract class action lawsuit against a New York public authority. The case involved novel issues of contract interpretation in a commercial development context.
In , obtained the dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds of a tribally chartered corporation defendant in a New York Labor Law action. International customary law, on the other hand, is only of limited assistance in solving legal problems of international commerce. There are few legal principles, such as pacta sunt servanda , which are generally recognised and can be termed international customary law.
From a practical point of view, the relevant alternative to international legislation is not so much customary law as international commercial custom in the widest sense, i. Commercial custom presupposes the de facto uniformity we find in certain contracts, contractual clauses or types of transactions already mentioned. Not every instance of uniformity in commercial and legal practice can be termed commercial custom, but some can.
Commercial custom provides guidance in the interpretation of contracts, their legal meaning and effect. If standard contracts, standard clauses or rules on the interpretation of such contract clauses are published by semi-official international agencies such as the International Chamber of Commerce, the de facto recognition and use of such contractual patterns and rules may lead to a new commercial custom or reflect an already existing one.
One can speculate whether such publications sometimes reflect or help to create international customary law. The articles in this book have been selected to appraise and evaluate to what extent uniformity in legal rules and contractual patterns of international commerce can be found, i.
But we should bear in mind that some confusion may be found in discussions on lex mercatoria or uniform law, and our different definitions of 'transnational law' can help us to overcome this. With regard to 'international legislation', i. When some authors speak of lex mercatoria as the 'autonomous law' of international trade, the term 'autonomous' can, in the context of international legislation, only mean that we have an international instead of a national source of law.
It is a little more difficult if we use lex mercatoria as a mere descriptive concept to describe existing de facto uniformity or similarity of the national laws and contracts concerning international commerce subsection B, para.
Here, a further distinction is in order. If we look first at certain similarities in national legislation or court decisions on, say, sales contracts or patent licences, which comparative lawyers traditionally try to discern, we should be rather cautious not to label these de facto similarities as 'transnational law' within our second definition, subsection B, para 2, above. Those similarities are welcome, and may be a first step towards uniformity; but by no means can we speak here of elements of an 'autonomous' law of international commerce.
With respect to contracts in international commerce and the standard clauses used in them, we can more easily speak of an 'autonomous' law, at least in the sense that the parties themselves create the legal regime for their transaction, a lex contractus.
It has often been said that this autonomy is not in conflict with the applicability of a national law because the parties make use of a contractual autonomy which is conferred and recognised by national laws. To what degree one can speak of uniformity when examining standard clauses, contractual patterns and rules is debatable.
The first controversy arises in recognising and evaluating de facto uniformity or similarity. This is the actual purpose of many of the articles in this book. The truly crucial question comes when we find such de facto similarity and must ask whether the clauses, rules or patterns have some normative effects beyond the individual contract in which they are expressly included or referred to. Here, we return to our problem whether international practice might have created international commercial custom or even customary law.
It is a particular concern of developing countries as parties in international commerce and economic co-operation to protect their economic interests 17 when dealing with partners from industrialised countries whom they deem economically stronger and more experienced in legal issues and the other technicalities of international commercial transactions. It has been argued that the best way to protect these interests is not a unification of the law of international commerce, but, instead, a legal regime reflecting the particular needs of the individual developing countries which is imposed on international commercial transactions either through mandatory national legislation or individual negotiation.
They feel that uniformity of rules is not as important as the assurance that the rules will be fair and equitable. The fact that many developing countries have taken an active part, e. As to the fairness of existing rules of commercial law and contractual clauses and patterns, developing countries have sometimes argued that these generally only reflect the interests and values of the industrialised countries. A simple response is not possible. As a matter of fact, future unification of the law of international commerce must engage the active participation of developing countries in the process of negotiating and drafting the rules to ensure that their views are adequately represented.
It was due to this problem that the Hague Convention from the outset had little chance of gaining acceptance by third-world countries. Because developing countries were consulted in its drafting, the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods has a good chance of wide acceptance.
Additionally, the more developing countries are involved in, and gain experience with, the technicalities of international commercial transactions, the more they will make a clear distinction between those legal rules and patterns which are necessary for co-operation and conflict avoidance, and those which entail unjust risk distribution or other unfair results.
In such a manner, the distinction between the law of developed and less-developed countries will, as such, disappear and be substituted by a common understanding of the problems of international commerce. The efforts toward unification of the law of international commerce are not unaffected by the demand for a 'New International Economic Order' for the benefit of developing countries. In various resolutions of the UN General Assembly, developing countries have expressed a strong demand for the establishment of such an order to assure a redistribution of market shares, income and resources in their favour.
The negotiation and drafting of this and other UN Codes have initiated a worldwide learning process on legal issues of international commerce and economic co-operation. On the other hand, it would help the discussion and facilitate the difficult business of unification of law, if everybody would see that rules on the law of commercial contracts, as such, cannot bring about the economic redistribution expected by many from the New Economic Order.
What a good contract law can do, at best, is to ensure fairness and clarity in a freely agreed international commercial transaction. A number of international organisations and institutions of varied legal status are active today in the elaboration and definition of uniform legal rules and patterns of international commerce. These activities are aimed either at the preparation of new international 'legislation', such as the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, or are aimed at the promulgation of standard rules and clauses.
The endeavours of these agencies, which will be generally described in Part Two of this book and further analysed in some of the subsequent articles, reflect a growing consensus among the international community that there is a need to unify or at least harmonise the law of commercial contracts and to standardise their patterns. It goes without saying that every such effort to define such uniform rules and patterns is aimed at bringing about not only more clarity and certainty but also more fairness through the balancing of interests.
Apart from these institutions and organisations, legal science has the important function of supporting and amending these efforts in two ways. First, in the drafting and negotiating process, the co-operation of legal scholars is needed to bring about a common international understanding of the legal issues and interests involved. Secondly, once a text on international commercial law a convention or a formulation of rules or clauses has been promulgated, its uniform application in practice can only be assured if a common understanding of its legal terms and principles is worked out by legal experts all over the world in a common effort.
For the significant role of liberalised world markets for world development, see, e. World Bank, World Development Report, p.
August See Special on Arab banking in Euromoney July , pp. II, p. II, 9, No national law is applicable, e. This page uses so called "cookies" to improve its service i.
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